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Comrades, is the main factor determining the nature of the new state apparatus and thus of the new army, making it a people's army.

The experience of the second world war teaches us that armies of the old type, armies built up by the bourgeois classes, had outlived their day historically and were unable to protect their nations from slavery.

The typical old-type army, the French army, and the armies of other European states, collapsed in the test of war. By contrast the new armies and armed forces were victorious. And this forces us to make a serious revision of all our former military habits, ideas, concepts, and practice.

From the historical experience of recent years we must draw conclusions which illuminate contemporary military problems and help us to find the proper path to building our new people's army.

Comrades, in the great war which recently ended, it was found that the popular masses were more capable organizers of armed resistance and successful struggle than the classes which had formerly organized the armies, i.e., than the bourgeoisie. We also know that the greatest military leaders of this period, the most talented leaders and victorious generals and marshals, the brilliant Stalin, Tito, the Soviet marshals, and finally also the successful leaders of the western armies, all come from the popular masses. We have seen furthermore that the popular masses in many countries were forced to improvise and, without any military experience, to build up armies against an experienced enemy; and they were victorious in the struggle. Naturally this was not achieved without bloody losses, experience bought at fearful price, but on the other hand it was precisely these difficult conditions which revealed and confirmed the path which the military policy of each nation must take in order truly to provide for national security.

Another fact of the great war through which we have just lived, an experience which is also confirmed by other wars of the past, is that initial preponderance of strength, whether in people or in materiel, is insufficient to achieve a military decision. We know today that the fate of the German war, the fate of the German Blitzkrieg and the attack in the east against the Slavic nations was sealed not when the Allies had numerical superiority, but much earlier, when the Allies were not numerically superior and when the Red Army was numerically weaker than the German army. The fact that mere numerical superiority does not bring victory in war is another proof that the forces of reaction cannot win and that progress is irresistible in our epoch.

I have spoken of initial numerical superiority. It is obvious that the forces of progress have many more followers in the world than the forces of reaction, and that ultimately the numerical superiority of the forces of progress was decisive in the struggle against German Fascism, although at the beginning of the war the Germans were much better prepared than their opponents, had absolute superiority in the number of soldiers whom they threw into battle, in the number of weapons, airplanes, artillery, etc, and, according to the belief which was current in Czechoslovakia before Munich, their victory was absolutely indisputable.

But it was found in the war that mere numerical superiority is insufficient, it is not decisive, and the fact was confirmed once again

that the decisive element is total fighting force, which is a combination of numerical force, mechanical force, moral force, military skill, etc.

It is precisely moral force which can balance numerical weakness and which, in the long run, may create a greater fighting force than is represented by initial numerical superiority.

All the great leaders knew of the importance of moral force and they also valued it highly. It is particularly interesting that in the old-type armies the importance of this element of total fighting force before the war was seriously undervalued, simply because the old-type armies were either armies of class oppression or of national oppression. Naturally the commanders of these armies could not rely on the moral force of their soldiers and therefore did not consider this to their own disadvantage or to the disadvantage of their armies.

The proper application of numerical, mechanical, moral, and other forces makes up total fighting force, such that great differences result in the effectiveness of armies.

The history of wars provides us with valuable proofs. For example, in Czechoslovak history we may point out the Hussite period when the Czechs fought against the greatest coalition of the time, practically against all of Europe. And they fought for decades with great success. Similarly we may point to the history of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic Wars. And above all, as I have already mentioned, we have the history of the second world war.

It is interesting and rather surprising that it was a German, the exponent of Prussian military theory, Clausewitz, who 130 years ago formulated the extraordinary significance of moral force for the total fighting strength of an army: "Moral force is a bright metal weapon while material force is merely the wooden handle". As you can see Clausewitz calls the material force used by an army merely a wooden handle, while he calls the moral force of an army, which is decisive in battle, a shining spear.

History also teaches us that the moral force of an army is comprised primarily and basically of political material. When we consider this element of the total fighting force of an army, moral force, we can see the basic connection between the political regime and the capability of an army, and we can see the role played by political problems in creating the overall fighting strength of an army.

It is particularly important for us to think over these problems and become acquainted with them, since our prewar military thinking and our prewar military practice do not stand up against historical experience. We can see, for example, that during the Munich period the idea prevailed in our general staff that the simple numerical relationship of forces was decisive. And from these ideas it was concluded that our position in any military conflict with Germany was hopeless. Our generals, General Syrový and other leaders in the general staff, simply observed that we had so many cannons, so many machine guns, so many tanks and aircraft, and that the Germans had 2 or 3 times as many, and that therefore our position was hopeless and that we must lose any military conflict. Our general staff believed in the military theory which seriously undervalued the importance of moral force and the moral factor, although the considerable historical experience which we have already noted shows clearly that victory is possible even if we are numerically weaker than our opponents in soldiers and materials.

Napoleon won many battles although he was numerically weaker than his opponents; General Suvorov fought in 62 battles of which he won 58, and he was always weaker than his opponents. Finally the most typical and most persuasive example is that of the victorious Red Army against superior German strength.

What I have said does not mean, however, that in order to be victorious over the enemy we must be numerically weaker. Our Hussites, Napoleon, Suvorov, and the Red Army were victorious among other things because the moral force of their armies far exceeded the moral force of their enemies. Naturally superior moral force alone is not enough for victory. To be victorious over our enemies in a war we must know how to fight, we must know how to handle arms, we must know the skills of war, have good organization, supply sufficient arms, ammunition, and equipment to the field of battle, and know how to develop superior working and organizational methods and fighting methods. But all of this, like moral force, is connected with the social structure of the nation and state, with the social order and political conditions.

It is no accident that Soviet organization triumphed over German organization, nor is it any accident that Soviet production was victorious over German production. The causes of this phenomenon should be sought in the social structure, in the social order. Political conditions thus influence not only the moral element of total fighting strength but they influence other elements as well.

Another important teaching of this past war and of all great wars in the past is that the basis of great victory, the basis of great decisions and success, is great effort and great sacrifice. Every great victory has always cost a high price. Frequently attempts have been made to show that sacrifice is not necessary, that some clever trick, some fraud, can win, that it is possible to avoid the necessity of great sacrifice, that the laws of history can somehow be cheated.

But the entire history of wars, all human history, again and again deny this belief, and this belief was again denied by the great patriotic war of nations which has recently ended. No great solution, whether military or concerning internal changes, was ever reached without great and often bloody sacrifice.

Nor in this past war did waiting or cunning or the path of least resistance bring victory; it was rather the determined use of maximum force directed toward destroying the main force of the enemy at the price of great sacrifice.

Sometimes it appears, and it is even said -- you will still hear it -- that the great sacrifices of the Red Army and the Soviet Union were extravagant, and that the western allies won the war in a much more clever manner than the Soviet Union. It is well known that the Soviet Union suffered truly unbelievable losses running to millions of human lives, and cost enormous effort, while for example the entire British empire lost only around 300,000 Anglo-Saxon soldiers and America's losses in comparison with those of the Soviet Union were insignificant. In spite of this, however, the western allies occupied Italy, France, and more than one-half of Germany, and it would seem at first glance that their military strategy was better and cleverer than Soviet strategy.

This attitude is the result of an optical illusion, since the outcome of the war was decided by the actions of the Red Army. The outcome of the war was decided primarily by the heroism of the Red Army and the enormous Soviet sacrifice (applause), by the fact that the Red army

succeeded in concentrating 90 percent and more of German forces, and was able not only to stop these main German forces, but to drive them back, defeat them, and finally completely destroy them (applause). And the sensational, surprising advance of the western allies, when subjected to detailed study and sharp examination, sometimes appears as merely filling in a vacuum.

Without the heroic struggle of the Red Army the allied landings in Africa would have been impossible and the advance of the allies in North Africa, Egypt, Tripoli, etc., would never have occurred. Detailed study of this war again and again convinces us that great historical decisions, settling the fate of nations not only for decades but actually for centuries, cost great sacrifice, great effort, as has always been the case at all critical phases of human history. We, the Czech nation, have in our own history a gentle warning not to overlook this historical lesson. In the time of White Mountain the leading classes of the nation, the Czech lords, rather than relying on the power of their own nation, rather than mobilizing their own people to struggle against the Hapsburgs, rather than preparing for a difficult and stubborn struggle and great sacrifice, oriented themselves toward foreign political combinations through which our cause was to be won cheaply. It turned out that these calculations ended in complete collapse and the loss of our freedom.

Again at the time of Munich we can see a completely similar situation. The political leadership of our nation oriented itself in the period before Munich toward doubtful international combinations, questionable combinations of international force, which when they collapsed, as the combinations collapsed in the time of White Mountain, brought down with them all our national freedom and political independence. For the second time in 500 years we were taught that freedom must be fought for with all our forces, the greatest sacrifices borne bravely and with determination; we were once again taught that we cannot avoid sacrifice and cheat history, that, one way or another, we are forced to bear these great sacrifices.

If we are now building up our own people's army we want to build it up so that it will in the future protect us from ruin in periods of storm, in times when the tempest shakes the very foundations of existence of the nation and state. Therefore our people's army, like every good army, must be built up from the very beginning with war constantly in mind; it must be prepared for the most difficult struggle, for if it is not so prepared it will ultimately be merely an unnecessary luxury which has burdened the national economy and in the end merely undermined national security because it created false illusions.

Of course, if an army is to be built up with war constantly in mind we must keep in mind also the conditions of warfare and the laws of military action, the laws of action on the field of battle.

The most characteristic feature of warfare is that it occurs in a special environment, the atmosphere of danger. Movement in an atmosphere of danger follows its own laws, and the behavior of people in such an environment is of course completely different from their behavior in a peaceful environment, in which the most important element of the military situation, danger, is lacking. The atmosphere of danger forces each person to show himself morally and spiritually stripped bare. In an atmosphere of danger people frequently react quite differently than in civilian life and it is impossible to determine in advance how any one individual will behave in an atmosphere of danger.

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Another characteristic of the situation on the field of battle is that military action occurs not in a transparent situation but rather under conditions of "murkiness". Many military theoreticians compare action on the field of battle to moving in the dark. Even if one has reliable reports on the enemy's situation much remains unknown; in addition, the military situation changes so quickly that military activity consists largely of continual reactions to something unseen and unknown. Thus, as special training is necessary to move in the night, and as a certain length of time is necessary for the human eye to accustom itself to darkness, special preparation and time are necessary for movement on the field of battle, before the human mind becomes accustomed to this environment, which at first sight appears completely incomprehensible.

These two factors, i.e., danger and incomprehensibility, the unusual difficulty of orienting oneself, mean that the feeling of uncertainty on the field of battle increases and a psychological environment is created in which the most important thing is to overcome fear and fatigue and increase the will to fight. Fear is the worst enemy of everyone on the field of battle because fear blinds, and a murky situation becomes completely dark. All who have been through war and been on the field of battle will agree that those who fall prey to fear and panic are the first victims of military action.

Therefore, building a capable people's army poses the primary task of training in fearlessness, in maximum strength, in the moral and physical capacity of holding up under all conditions of military action, in the capacity to react rapidly, calmly, and correctly to unseen events; training the will to fight and the readiness to lay down one's life on the field of battle. But of course this cannot be achieved only by specialized military training. The creation of such qualities again is connected with the social order, with political and social conditions in the country, with national tradition, with the living standards of the population, with the cultural environment of the country, etc.

Many elements outside the range of military organizations thus share in creating the qualities which are necessary on the field of battle; therefore building a good people's army must be the general concern, and must be considered always in connection with all factors which affect these qualities.

Despite all the development of modern weapons human beings continue to be the main factor in military struggle, a fact which we must keep in mind. This must be emphasized because we can observe as an almost regular phenomenon that whenever a new type of weapon is discovered miraculous effects are always attributed to it. New weapons are frequently considered to make war impossible, because no practical defense against them is thought to exist, or they are said to be able to decide the outcome of a war within a few hours.

Tendencies have always appeared to push into the background the importance of human beings and to increase the importance of mechanical force.

Today on all sides extraordinary importance is attached to the newly discovered atomic bomb, and efforts are again being made to say that the effect of mechanical weapons, the effects of the atomic bomb, will be of much more importance for military struggle than human beings. The belief has even been expressed that the war in the Far East was decided by the two atomic bombs which were dropped on Japan. This is deception, of course, and does not in the least correspond to fact. We know that the

Japanese decided to capitulate at the very time the Soviet Union had declared war on them. The Japanese had no other alternative because they could see clearly that the Red Army, which had defeated the German army, once the strongest in the world, would defeat the Japanese army much more quickly since this army could not compare with the German army. From the moment that the Soviet Union declared war on Japan all Japanese prospects not only for a successful outcome to the war but even for merely successfully continuing the war were hopeless.

Detailed study shows us again and again that even in the Far East the outcome of the war was decided by the heroism and struggles of the Red Army, that the power and strength of the Soviet Union made the decision. The Germans lost the second world war primarily because they were unable, even at considerable effort, to break the will of Soviet citizens to fight and to infuse the Red Army with their will. It is precisely the Soviet-German war which shows us clearly that the decisive factor in war is human beings. And we can also see that only the army which is equipped to resist all influences undermining the will to fight can be a good and victorious army.

But the will to fight, on the other hand, means that each fighter considers the cause of the war to be his own personal cause, and that in this spirit he is prepared to conduct his own personal war against the common enemy. It is a poor army whose fighters do not fight on their own initiative, whose members do not fight their own personal battles, and whose leadership is unable to concentrate its attention on coordinating these individual battles and combining them into an organic unit of battles led forcefully and unitedly.

It is a well known and proven fact that there really exists such a phenomenon as mass voluntary personal battles, that millions of fighters can truly consider the cause of the war to be their own personal cause, and that they can march to war with elan, initiative, and the maximum outpouring of their personal energies. It is not true, as the command of the Czechoslovak army before Munich sometimes thought, that soldiers must be forced to enter battle, that they cannot be trusted, that their initiative, their will to fight, their readiness to march into battle and die for the cause of freedom cannot be relied upon.

But for each fighter to conduct successfully his own personal battle with all his energy requires that confidence exist between commanders and soldiers, confidence both of the soldiers in the commanders and of the commanders in their soldiers. Without an atmosphere of maximum confidence one cannot even speak of the conduct of individual battles. Without mutual confidence the soldiers will govern themselves as they see fit while the commanders, on the other hand, will not dare to demand of the soldiers anything exceeding the bounds of their insufficient confidence in them; they must assume that their plans and commands will be carried out only partially, and not 100 percent. Confidence develops where there are common interests. From the requirement for confidence between commanders and soldiers it follows that armies in which common interests do not exist between commanders and soldiers cannot be good armies. Ignoring the company of thieves which commanded the German army, we can see that the requirement for mutual interests can be fulfilled today only in a people's army, i.e., in an army in which the commanders are not representatives of an oppressing class but are a part of the popular masses.

Thus an army must in a political and psychological sense form a homogeneous unit in which there are mutual confidence, political

conscientiousness, and will to fight. Only in such an army, in which there exists an atmosphere of confidence between commanders and soldiers may there develop a truly iron discipline which is another basic indication of a good army.

The demand for iron discipline conflicts in no way with the popular and democratic nature of an army. The demand for iron discipline in the modern army, in a people's army, is understandable as soon as we consider the situation on the field of battle. The storm of battle can be likened to a natural catastrophe. In such a situation, when the winds are crying and trees are falling, in a natural catastrophe, it is clear to everyone that there is no time for discussion or argument as to what should be done. It is clear to everyone that under such a situation there is no time to discuss procedure, that what must be done must be done quickly and with organization and unity, if the elements of nature are to be withstood. In the storm of battle it is also necessary that orders be carried out immediately, that all individual battles, all individual activity be directed toward a common goal.

Therefore iron discipline cannot be in conflict with the popular and democratic nature of an army since it is merely an unavoidable requirement for capability. The democratic and popular nature of an army can thus not force a concession in the demand for iron discipline in the army, or for vigorous training; rather, a people's army must make full use of all opportunities to raise its discipline, effectiveness, and strength to the highest level.

Since the morale of an army is composed primarily of political material, a good army must be a political army as well; this is another basic indication of every good army. An army must be political in the sense that it is perfectly clear to every fighter what the purpose of the war is and that the goal of the war must be his own cause; an army must thus be basically an army of conscientious soldiers fighting voluntarily and for their own interests. The political connection between events at home and abroad must be clear to the soldiers so that each of them will have his own personal interest in crushing the enemy.

Good soldiers are ultimately only those who have come to grips with death, and who do not give their own safety priority over the safety of the entire nation and state.

All wars and all great battles, including the second world war, are decided by precisely those heroes whose spirits were not crushed by the greatest force of the enemy, who did not submit to his will even at the cost of their own lives. Brave soldiers fight against the enemy even after death, while cowards merely multiply his strength. Even if a brave soldier is wounded or killed, his bravery, his resistance, his heroism, gnaw at the spirit of the victor and weaken his morale, and thus the brave soldier fights the enemy even after death. A coward strengthens the self-confidence of the enemy and multiplies his power.

Therefore, since time immemorial all armies who are conscious of their honor have looked upon the coward as an enemy. In a good army every atom of physical and mental strength must be strained to defeat the enemy and to spoil his plans, whether they be carried out by concentrating the greatest power and resources.

It was precisely the application of this principle which destroyed the German Blitzkrieg. The basis of the Blitzkrieg was the concentration of enormous military resources on a single point to force the

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defender to hide from the incessant fire, to flee from the path of the aggressor and to allow his columns free rein.

This succeeded in France, Belgium, and elsewhere in Europe and failed for the first time in the Soviet Union. Against the greatest attack and under the worst conditions the Red Army came out of hiding and at great cost attacked the German columns, fell upon them, disorganized them, and drove them back, thus threatening the success of the German wedge tactics, until these tactics and the Blitzkrieg as a whole were destroyed. Precisely because no terror forced the Red Army to accept the German will the Red Army was able to defeat the German army, albeit at the price of great loss.

In the first months of the war the Soviet soldiers fought the advancing German tanks by throwing themselves, girt with hand grenades, under the tanks and stopping them with their bodies, because they knew that if the tank passed they could expect either a disgraceful death in a German prison camp or a slow death in German slavery. And precisely this heroism of the Soviet fighters comprised the "atomic" bomb which shook the self-confidence of the German army and ultimately caused its utter defeat.

As I have already said the fighting strength of an army does not consist only in moral strength, however, but it lies also in the organization of the army, its equipment, training, and numbers. A people's army must and can have the most modern organization, the best equipment, the best training, and the best reserves. It has the best opportunity for the entire nation to be its reserves. The time spent in obligatory service must for every member of the people's army be only a part of his preparation for military struggle and only an introduction to the systematic improvement which must continue even outside the army.

I have told you briefly of some historical lessons which must be considered in organizing and building a good people's army. And now I should like to say a few words concerning our own Czechoslovak problems.

We face, I believe, two turning problems which must be solved. One is the pattern which is to be followed in building our people's army, and the other is the problem of the cadre of commanders, i.e., the officer corps of our new army. Before the war we based the structure, organization, and training of our army on the experience of the first world war, and on the experience represented by the principal victorious army of the time, i.e., the French army. We were forced to do this because we had no military tradition of our own. Our military development was interrupted at White Mountain and for 300 years there was no Czech army which could create our own military tradition. Therefore we were forced, and the political leadership of the nation at the time determined that it was necessary, to turn to foreign examples.

But in the fire of the second world war it was found that this French school and the tradition based on it simply collapsed. In the fire of the second world war it was found that the best army in the world, which alone was able to defeat the greatest aggressive military machine in history, the German army, was the Soviet army, the Red Army.

Today in organizing our army we must again look about for an example. Our army as a whole, except for the foreign divisions, had no military experience in the second world war and did not gain its own experiences; therefore we are again condemned to look about for other examples and to decide which one to follow.

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I believe that the second world war showed us all clearly where we should seek the example for building our new people's army. Not only because the Red Army liberated our country, but primarily because it is perfectly clear and unquestionable that the Red Army is the best army in the world. After the first world war it was not so clear that the French army was the best army since on the western front the Germans were faced with a great coalition in which about 120 French divisions fought alongside 90 English divisions and more than 100 American divisions. For this reason it was not entirely clear who and to what extent decided the outcome of the war in the west against Germany. By contrast the Red Army in the second world war fought 250 divisions of Germans and their allies, while the western allies held in check for several years only 4 German divisions in North Africa and, in the final phase of the war, no more than 25 or 30 German divisions in the west. In the second world war the entire strength of the German army and its allies, against which more than 7 armies fought in the first world war (American, English, French, Italian, Belgian, the allied armies in the Balkans, etc) was turned against the Red Army. The Germans fought for a long time on only one front. During this time the total strength of Germany was much greater than in the first world war. It was thus demonstrated with crystal clarity that by far the best army in the world was the Soviet army, the Red Army.

In addition this is a Slavic army, an army which is the main defense of all Slavic nations against German aggression in the east.

In the west it is no secret that in the face of a repetition of German aggression the west cannot effectively help the small nations and states lying to the east of Germany. It is openly said in the west that only the Soviet Union can save these nations from a new attack, new slavery, and new terror. The western allies simply do not have sufficient resources for such a task. This is another reason why we must both rely on the alliance with the Soviet Union and seek our example in the Red Army, because if the Germans again attack the Slavs, if a front of Slavic armies must be formed against German attack, the need for unified leadership forces us to turn to the Soviet example, the example of the Red Army, and by the use of standardized equipment to make use of the remote centers of Soviet war industry beyond the Urals.

There are therefore many reasons why we should vigorously attempt to fulfill that part of the government program which specifies that the equipment, organization, arms, and training of our army will be unified with the equipment, organization, arms, and training of the Red Army.

This, in a few words, is the answer to where we must seek our example.

As regards the officer corps we face a very complicated and important task. Our pre-Munich army had an officer corps in which various military traditions met and conflicted. At that time the army contained one group of officers trained in the Austrian army, an army of national and social oppression, an army which lacked confidence between officers and soldiers, whose officer corps was an exclusive group isolated from the popular masses, and whose fighting strength was therefore not great. Another element of the prewar officer corps was made of legionnaires whose tradition was one of resistance to the Hapsburgs, who evoked the Hussite tradition, and among whom there were considerable tendencies toward a popular army. However, this group of legionnaires was dissolved before the war in the course of development and some of the legionnaires joined the ideological camp of those officers who were of the

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Austrian military school. And finally a third component of our prewar officer corps consisted of new officers who were trained in the military academy. In the first years after its founding the academy was directed by legionnaire officers, but later it came under the ideological influence of the old military school and thus many of our new officers were distinguished by features typical for the Austrian military school, i.e., isolation from the masses, lack of confidence in the soldiers, and an inclination toward ideas which were in conflict with historical military experience. Preparation for military struggle and training in military discipline were, in the minds of these officers, a leveling of the soldier's individuality, suppression of individual thinking and toughness, which was transformed into rudeness toward the soldiers. Political training had no access and an important means of maintaining military discipline was punishment and fear of punishment, all of which were features characteristic of the bad Austrian army. A soldier who is to be trained to overcome fear on the field of battle should not be trained to fear in time of peace.

The failure to appreciate the significance of political training and of other important elements in the fighting strength of the army thus strengthened reactionary tendencies and increased the numbers of admirers of Hitler's fascism, increased the number of people who weakened the army morally, made it less capable to fight the military forces of German fascism.

We have inherited an uncongenial officer corps in building our new people's army today. The fight against Austrian tradition, which was not won before Munich, remains a problem. Re-training the officer corps, creating a new army tradition, are necessary conditions for a true people's army. Our new people's army must cease isolating the leaders from the soldiers and from the working masses. An end must be put to the failure to appreciate moral strength of our fighters and our people, and the doctrine of numbers, in which the living man remains in the background, must be eliminated.

Everything demanded from the soldier on the field of battle must be given by the commanders in even fuller measure. The commanders must be brave, resolute, and cool; they must not lose their heads in the most difficult situations. In the most difficult situations the commanders must direct the action of their soldiers; otherwise they will cease to fulfill their function and cease to be commanders. Commanders must be well trained, technically, morally, and politically for the tasks of national defense, and must be capable of developing initiative and the instruments of iron discipline and themselves apply iron discipline. The commanders must set an example to the soldiers and support them on the field of battle, and must gain the confidence of the soldiers without which the commander's functions on the battlefield cannot be carried out. Cowards cannot be tolerated among soldiers and even less among commanders. Commanders must trust their soldiers, since this is one of the basic conditions for increasing their skill as commanders. The commanders must not train the army in a sense of fear which must then be overcome in military struggle. The commanders must be capable of leading their soldiers to victory in the most unfavorable situations, as Suvorov did and as all great leaders and outstanding commanders have done. Commanders can never think primarily of themselves and leave their soldiers to the whims of fate, and they cannot cease for an instant to be the nerve center of operations. The soldiers must receive training from the commanders expanding their horizons and making conscientious fighters of them. Our officers must be on a high technical plane and must cultivate military thinking and develop military theory. They must also participate in public

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life, associating with the popular masses and receiving recognition from them. They must be effective agents of military training of the civilian population and they must help the organizations which are providing defense training for the entire nation.

Our special position as the most westerly Slavs on the most westerly Slavic promontory places still greater demands on our people's army. Our geographical position makes it conceivable that in any new war against the Slavs our country would quickly be cut off by German attack and we would be forced temporarily to fight while surrounded.

It is therefore particularly important for us to be prepared for such a battle and such a situation, to be prepared for a militarily very difficult role, to master all the historical lessons of the great military campaign, and to learn all methods of armed struggle. Our national mentality must be inculcated with the features which distinguish all viable nations and particularly the great nations. We must be aware that in battle we must show determination, increase our efforts, and be capable of exerting the greatest energy toward the end of the military campaign in the so-called strategic zenith. Blitzkrieg is possible only against weak and undetermined nations, not against viable nations who value their freedom. The principal purpose of a Blitzkrieg is to destroy instantly the will to resist and to subject the defender to the aggressor's force. This succeeds only where the moral and political prerequisite sites exist.

History shows that wherever an aggressor encounters a proud and freedom-loving people neither terror nor powerful resources are sufficient to destroy the will to resist. We know that Napoleon, at the peak of his military power, failed in Spain against the Spanish peasants because they would not submit to his will even under terror and force of arms. We know also that in 1812 he failed in Russia with the greatest military force basically because with powerful blows he was unable to destroy the Russian peasants' and Russian citizens' will to resist. The fact that Napoleon occupied Spain and penetrated deep into Russia aroused the resistance of the popular masses to such a degree that the entire land which he occupied blazed beneath his feet, forcing him ultimately to flee.

The Germans expected that a great shock would be enough to weaken the will of all to resist and that their plans would succeed. Soviet military theory even before the war denied this German thesis and based Soviet strategy on the assumption of growing resistance which would culminate in the strategic zenith. Soviet strategy guessed right and the Germans were wrong. This knowledge must become part of our national mentality so that at the first attack we will not weaken, we will not be demoralized and fall prey to defeatist psychosis, so that on the contrary at every attack we will be able to increase our resistance and our force on the example of all truly freedom-loving nations; we must know how to make any aggressor who penetrates our land flee. Building a people's army in Czechoslovakia therefore embraces a very wide task, which is to increase national strength, national stability, and the will to defend our freedom at any cost.

In any future war our people's army must become the nucleus of the defensive struggle of the entire nation, and in peace be the nucleus of its armed preparedness. Our people's army must be capable of withstanding without flinching enemy fire, even the fiercest, to withstand the greatest physical strain, suffering, cold, and hunger, to resist psychological depression and have better nerves and morale than the enemy.

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Our people's army must be a master of defense and of offense as well, because without offense the enemy cannot be destroyed. Therefore our people's army must be equipped with modern equipment for attack as well, it must be able to handle its weapons, and its commanders must know how to organize and direct the offensive action of armies, have a thorough mastery of military thinking, and be brave, resolute, and unshakable.

Our preparation for the defense of freedom and the preparation of our people's army for this task requires, however, that the army and its members continue their military development even outside the scope of obligatory service. If our army is to be truly capable a great deal must still be done, both within the army and throughout the entire nation. We must turn the attention of the entire public to problems of national defense, to military problems. We must be aware even now that after what the Germans experienced in the second world war, when they were evacuated from Czechoslovakia by the millions, when they suffered such a terrible defeat, in a future war any hesitation on our part, any weakness will have immediate and catastrophic results in the form of our complete extermination.

The importance of nationwide preparation for defense against any possible repetition of attack cannot be overemphasized. The entire nation and all members of the nation must be prepared for any future war or for the possibility of a new German attack much better than they were before Munich, politically, morally, and militarily, by being acquainted with military problems and at least having an elementary knowledge of how to handle weapons. We are forced to this by the necessity of preserving our national existence and of fulfilling our obligation toward our liberators to whom we owe such an enormous debt.

But for these goals to be achieved we must use new methods and new resources rather than those used in the period before Munich. Today we must organize political training in the army, we must organize pre-military and post-military training and elementary military training of the entire population. We must provide for the physical health of youth, for their physical and moral firmness; we must study in great detail the experience of the great patriotic war of the Soviet people, the great partisan struggles of the Soviet people and other nations; and we must see to it that social and political conditions in the country be favorable for the development of the armed forces of the nation. In the achievement of these goals of building armed forces we must enlist our cultural front, our writers, poets, composers, specialized literature, the press, theater, films, and radio. We must approach very seriously the solution of complex problems associated with building up our national armed forces and building our people's army.

Finally, I would like to emphasize to our own people, the Communists, one more important lesson of this past war and of all preceding wars.

The class which holds political power, which leads the nation, is in time of war called upon to organize and conduct the military struggle; therefore all those who wish to remain in the leadership of the nation must understand not only political problems but organizational and military problems as well.

Let us consider the examples of our great teachers, the great leaders and teachers of the working-class movement -- Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. All of these were not only brilliant masters of political strategy but they were also masters of organization and masters of

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military thinking, even though not all of them had the opportunity to demonstrate this in war. Marx and Engels studied military questions and wrote theoretical articles on them. Lenin also studied military theory and all the outstanding military authors, criticized them, and used their military experience in organizing the October Revolution. And finally the greatest living master of political strategy and organization and of military thinking is Comrade Stalin.

Today new social classes and new political parties are coming to power in Czechoslovakia. Therefore we must become aware of our great new responsibility; our daily interests and our daily tasks must include, in addition to political, economic, and organizational problems military problems, the problems of armed preparedness of the nation, i.e., problems of the army. In the second world war it was proven that the best army in the world was organized and led by Communists. And this is not only a historic challenge for us but an obligation as well (Long applause).